Demand Management Incentives Review: Creating a level playing field for network DM in the National Electricity Market by Dunstan, C et al.
Creating a level  
playing field for network  






INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
The Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) was established by the University of Technology Sydney 
in 1996 to work with industry, government and the community to develop sustainable futures 
through research and consultancy. Our mission is to create change toward sustainable futures that 
protect and enhance the environment, human wellbeing and social equity. For further information 
visit: www.isf.uts.edu.au 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
ISF would like to express its appreciation to the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) for 
funding the Demand Management Incentives Review (DM Incentives Review).  This report draws 
heavily on, and builds upon, the two submissions made by ISF to the AER’s Demand Management 
Incentive Scheme process. See: https://www.aer.gov.au/networks-pipelines/guidelines-schemes-
models-reviews/demand-management-incentive-scheme-and-innovation-allowance-mechanism  
The research team would also like to thank partner organisations and their staff who have 
contributed to the development of the DM Incentives Review model and this report, both through 
the Study Reference Group (see Appendix F) and through stakeholder consultation events.  The 
authors greatly value the diversity of views that was brought to this study from across the energy 
sector including, network businesses, Decentralised Energy Resource and Demand Management 
service providers, government, regulators and industry experts. 
The responsibility for the contents of this report remains with ISF. 
This report has been submitted to ARENA as part of the DM Incentives Review (contract number 
P01051):  
ACCESSING THE DMIR MODEL 
To access the Demand Management Incentives Review Model (DMIR Model), which was used for 
the analysis in this report, please request a copy by emailing ISF at: isf@uts.edu.au  
CITATION 
Please cite this repot as:  
Dunstan, C., Alexander, D., Morris, T., Langham, E., Jazbec, M., 2017, Demand Management 
Incentives Review: Creating a level playing field for network DM in the National Electricity 
Market (Prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney). 
DISCLAIMER:  
This report is based on the findings of the DM Incentives Review and reflects the assessment and 
judgment of the research team only and does not necessarily represent the opinions of other 
stakeholders who have contributed to the study.  Readers are reminded of the need to ensure that 
the information upon which they rely is up to date and appropriate.  The authors have used all due 
care and skill to ensure the material is accurate at the date of this submission.  ISF and the authors 
do not accept any responsibility for any loss that may arise by anyone relying upon its contents. 
 
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES  
University of Technology Sydney  
PO Box 123 Broadway, NSW, 2007  
www.isf.edu.au  
© UTS June 2017  
  
 Demand Management Incentives Review      June 2017            
  i 




1 The importance of DM ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 What is Demand Management? ........................................................................... 1 
1.2 DM in Australia ................................................................................................... 1 
1.3 DM = “Duck Management”? ................................................................................ 4 
2 Regulatory Incentives and DM ........................................................................................... 7 
2.1 Barriers to DM..................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 The DM Incentives Review ................................................................................... 9 
2.3 Modelling Results .............................................................................................. 11 
2.4 DM bias and net market benefits ....................................................................... 15 
2.5 Disaggregating the elements of bias against DM ................................................ 16 
3 Designing the DM Incentive Scheme ................................................................................ 18 
3.1 Principles and metrics for a DM Incentive Scheme .............................................. 18 
3.2 Normalising DM cost recovery ........................................................................... 19 
3.3 Proposed structure of a DM incentive ................................................................ 20 
3.4 Setting the level of the DM incentive ................................................................. 20 
3.5 Timing of delivery and recovery of the DM incentive .......................................... 24 
3.6 Including price-based DM .................................................................................. 25 
3.7 Information and reporting requirements ........................................................... 25 
3.8 Estimating the value of net market benefits ....................................................... 26 
4 Competition in DM services ............................................................................................. 29 
5 DM Innovation Allowance ............................................................................................... 30 
6 Transitional DM Measures .............................................................................................. 31 
6.1 The rationale for transitional measures.............................................................. 31 
6.2 Clearly defined deliverables ............................................................................... 33 
6.3 Targetting and exclusions .................................................................................. 33 
6.4 Available or dispatched capacity? ...................................................................... 34 
6.5 Clearly defined scale and budget ....................................................................... 34 
6.6 Relevant precedents .......................................................................................... 35 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 36 
Appendix A:  DMIR Study Scope ........................................................................................... 37 
Appendix B:  DM Incentives Review Model  - Dashboard ...................................................... 40 
Appendix C:  Results from the Modelling .............................................................................. 41 
Appendix D:  US Electricity Efficiency Spending ..................................................................... 47 
Appendix E:  DMIR Study Reference Group ........................................................................... 49 
 Demand Management Incentives Review      June 2017            
  ii 
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 
SUMMARY 
Demand Management: The missing link in Australian electricity reform  
Electricity Demand Management (DM) is deliberate action by power utilities to encourage 
consumers to reduce or shift their electricity use as an alternative to providing new electricity 
supply.   The absence of balanced incentives for efficient DM has been a major gap in Australia’s 
National Electricity Market (NEM) since its establishment in 1998. The cost to energy consumers of 
this gap has likely run to hundreds of millions dollars or more, due to unnecessarily high electricity 
bills and excessive generation and network infrastructure spending.   
To illustrate, if the NEM had access to the same proportion of DM as the average for states of the 
USA, it would have about 3000MW of DM.  This is almost twice the total capacity of the recently 
retired 1600 MW Hazelwood coal fired power station, and is more than the total combined capacity 
proposed in the recent announcements by the South Australian Government, Our Energy Plan (up 
to 350 MW1) and the Australian Government’s Snowy 2.0 (estimated 2000 MW).  
Following a change to the National Electricity Rules in 2015, the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER) is required to develop a Demand Management Incentive Scheme (DMIS) and the Demand 
Management Innovation Allowance (DMIA).  This crucial reform represents the best chance in the 
history of the Australian electricity supply system to facilitate widespread, efficient and cost-
effective DM by distribution network businesses.   
To support the AER in developing the new DM Incentive Scheme, the Australian Renewable Energy 
Agency (ARENA) commissioned the Institute for Sustainable Futures at UTS (ISF) to undertake this 
DM Incentives Review. The review’s purpose is, for the first time, to assess and quantify the 
financial barriers to DM created by existing economic regulatory incentives for distribution network 
businesses.   
It is crucial that when network businesses are making their procurement decisions, they are subject 
to fair and balanced incentives.  Where regulatory incentives are efficient and balanced, the 
network business should achieve higher net profits if they undertake measures that deliver higher 
net benefits to their customers.  If regulatory incentives are inefficient and biased against DM, a 
network business may receive a lower net profit from a DM solution that would deliver a higher net 
benefit for customers. 
The key findings from this DM Incentives Review are: 
1) In distribution network regulation, there are currently significant barriers to implementing 
cost effective DM. These barriers include: 
a) Recovery of DM operating expenditure (opex) is treated less favourably than recovery 
of non-DM network opex, and less favourably than network capital expenditure 
(capex) and; 
b) There is a bias in favour of network capex, relative to DM and other opex; and  
c) Future ‘option value’ is generally excluded when considering DM solutions. 
All three barriers are important, but the first appears to be the most significant. 
1 Up to 250MW of temporary diesel and new gas fired generation and 100 MW of battery storage, South Australian 
Government, Our Energy Plan, http://ourenergyplan.sa.gov.au/assets/our-energy-plan-sa-web.pdf  
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2) In addition to the bias in the regulation of distribution network businesses, there are other 
net market benefits of Network DM that are not currently accessible by any market 
participants.  
3) To correct for these inefficiencies in regulatory settings, an effective DM Incentive Scheme 
should be applied. 
4) An effective DM incentive would both offset the current regulatory bias against DM and 
allow distribution network businesses to retain a share of the non-network net market 
benefits, and thereby deliver benefits to consumers by stimulating efficient network DM.  
This would perform an analogous role to the existing Efficiency Benefits Sharing Scheme 
(EBSS), the Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS) and the Service Target Performance 
Incentive Scheme (STPIS) which share benefits between distribution network businesses 
and customers. 
5) The DM incentive should be structured one of the following two ways: 
a) as a performance-based DM “Incentive Payment” (DMIP), in terms of dollars per 
kilowatt of peak demand reduction per year; that is, $/kWpeak per year or $/kVApeak per 
year; or, 
b) as a DM “Cost Uplift” (DMCU), in terms of a dollars of additional cost recovery, 
proportional to the cost to the distribution network business of the DM solution. 
6) Of these two options, the performance-based DMIP is more directly linked to demand 
reduction and value created, but the DMCU is easier for the AER to administer, and offers 
more flexibility and certainty for distribution network businesses.  
7) Given the importance of DM opex cost recovery, ISF recommends a ‘two-pronged’ 
approach to a DM Incentive Scheme: 
a) “Normalising DM cost recovery”, which treats proposed DM opex in a regulatory 
assessment on terms equal to capex and non-DM opex; and 
b) A DM incentive, to provide a financial benefit to encourage distribution network 
businesses to undertake DM opex.    
8) On balance, it is probably most efficient to set a DM incentive at the same level for all DM 
in all network territories for the entire forthcoming network regulatory determinations 
(from 2019 to 2025). 
9) The stipulated level of a DMIP should be set in the range of $50 to $100/kWpeak per year; 
alternatively, a DMCU should be set in the range 40% to 90% of the DM cost to the 
distribution network business. 
10) The bias against DM opex relative to other opex is mainly because opex has not 
traditionally formed a significant proportion of total opex. The more that DM is built into 
the normal opex planning budget, the less the bias will be. The distribution network 
businesses should therefore be encouraged by the AER to develop and submit detailed DM 
Plans of proposed DM action as part of their five-yearly regulatory proposals. 
11) The DM incentive should be made available to distribution network businesses both for DM 
which is proposed in their DM Plans and regulatory proposals, and for other DM 
opportunities that are subsequently identified during the regulatory period.  
12) Payment of the DM incentive to a network business should be contingent on the network 
business publicly demonstrating a net benefit to customers. 
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13) In cases where the stipulated level of the DM incentive exceeds the expected net benefit to 
consumers, network businesses should be permitted to recover less than the maximum 
stipulated level of DM incentive in order ensure net benefits to customers. 
14) There is a strong case for state and territory governments to establish transitional DM 
incentives, both to expedite the delivery of benefits from DM to their communities, and to 
facilitate a smooth transition to the full introduction of the new DM Incentive Scheme 
between now and 2021.  
15) While this Review’s scope included only the impact of economic regulatory incentives, 
there are other important non-regulatory drivers and potential biases in the decisions of 
distribution network businesses. These relate to network businesses’ culture, conventions, 
expertise and risk management. The AER should also consider the impact of these other 
drivers and biases in setting the DMIS.  
Our study method 
This study, the DM Incentives Review, was designed to test the following hypothesis: 
Study hypothesis to be tested: 
Consider a situation where a distribution network business faces a network constraint with two 
equally reliable solutions – a network capex (capital expenditure) solution and a DM opex 
(operating expenditure) solution.  The current regulatory incentives will deliver the distribution 
network business a higher net profit from the network capex solution, even in cases where the 
customers would receive a higher net benefit from the DM opex solution. 
 
This DM Incentives Review was intended to identify and quantify economic regulatory barriers to 
network businesses transitioning towards a more decentralised and service-oriented business 
model, and recommend appropriate incentives to address these barriers.  The foundation of the 
Review is a complex spreadsheet model. This model analyses how current AER regulations impact 
on the financial incentives for network businesses in choosing between network investment and 
DM solutions.  In other words, the model examines how network and DM solutions to network 
constraints impact on network businesses’ costs, revenues and profits. 
Why DM is particularly important now 
Since the NEM was established in 1998, there have been several major missed opportunities to 
apply DM in order to trim billions of dollars of supply infrastructure costs and energy bills. 
Notwithstanding these “sunk costs” in infrastructure, there are now major emerging trends in the 
electricity sector which mean that establishing balanced incentives for DM is more important than 
ever.  These major trends include:  
1. The rapid growth of variable output renewable power generation such as wind and solar, 
for which flexible DM is likely to be the most cost-effective complement. 
2. The rise in small-scale decentralised generation, such as rooftop solar photovoltaics (PV), 
which creates both challenges and opportunities for managing energy supply and demand 
in the local low voltage network. 
3. The rise in low-cost decentralised energy storage, in particular batteries, both in standalone 
units and in electric vehicles.  These provide both a load and a generation resource.  If well 
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managed, batteries could deliver lower costs and greater reliability for consumers.  But if 
not well coordinated, including through DM, these new technologies could also impose 
major costs to consumers and adversely impact supply reliability.  
4. The emergence of smart energy management, including through “internet of things” 
technologies, offers very large potential to reduce costs to consumers.  Smart remote 
monitoring and control of appliances and equipment, such as Demand Response Enabling 
Devices, are already installed in many air conditioners, pool pumps, water heaters, etc.  
Tapping this technology, in conjunction with large-scale, intelligent, real-time consumer-
responsive software (such as applied by ride sharing services like UBER), could offer large 
cost savings for consumers and major economic development opportunities.  
These new decentralised technologies and services are likely to be best developed in a vibrant, 
competitive market for DM, which will require both available supply of DM services and effective 
demand for these services.  Potential DM service providers already exist, as illustrated by numerous 
precedents including the response to the recent AEMO and ARENA proposals for Demand Response 
for reliability purposes.   While demand for wholesale and energy market DM is growing in the 
context of more cost reflective pricing, the demand for network DM services has to date been very 
limited.    
Network DM depends on detailed information related to specific network constraints, for which the 
network business is the ultimate planner and procurer. Consequently, the market demand for 
network DM can only come from network businesses.  But network businesses may only be 
expected to create such demand where it is in their commercial interests to do so.  As network 
businesses are regulated monopolies, these interests are strongly driven by the incentives created 
by regulation. 
The future of an affordable, reliable and clean power supply in Australia depends on creating an 
effective market for network DM services. This market needs the AER to apply a balanced set of 
regulatory incentives through an effective DM Incentive Scheme, and complementary DM policies 
by state and territory governments to expedite the creation of this market. 
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1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DM  
1.1 What is Demand Management? 
Electricity Demand Management (DM) means deliberate action taken by those responsible for 
electricity supply to reduce or shift demand for electricity, as an alternative to providing supply to 
meet that demand.  Therefore, DM does not include involuntary load shedding or “blackouts”, or 
independent decisions by consumers to lower their demand or manage their energy use.  
DM can facilitate low cost carbon emission reduction, both directly by helping consumers to reduce 
energy consumption, and indirectly, by providing flexible demand to complement variable output 
renewable wind and solar generation. 
Network DM generally involves network businesses contracting for, and otherwise supporting, 
decentralised energy resources (DER) as an alternative to investing in new network infrastructure.  A 
summary of DM examples is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Decentralised Energy Resources (DER) which can be tapped for DM 
 
1.2 DM in Australia 
DM has great potential to reduce energy costs for consumers as well as to enhance reliability.  For 
example, the Australian Energy Market Commission’s (AEMC) 2012 Power of Choice review2 
estimated that the potential benefits were worth between $4 billion and $12 billion in the period 
from 2013/14 to 2022/23 (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2. Benefits of demand management in the NEM (2013/14 to 2022/23) 
The potential of DM to support reliable electricity supply while reducing total costs has been widely 
recognised for many decades.  For example, residential off-peak water heating has been available in 
Victoria since the early 1930s.3  However, this potential has seldom been embraced by policy makers, 
regulators and market leaders in Australia.  Notable exceptions include the Demand Management 
Action Plan undertaken by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria between 1990 and 1994, and 
the Energy Conservation and Demand Management Plan established in 2009 by the Queensland 
Government with that state’s electricity distribution businesses.4    
Despite early good intentions that, “Demand management … options are intended to have equal 
opportunity alongside conventional supply side options to satisfy future requirements”5, DM has been 
largely neglected in the NEM.6  
Since its establishment in in 1998, the National Electricity Market’s failure to provide balanced 
incentives for DM has been a major “blind spot” and has likely cost energy consumers hundreds of 
millions or more in unnecessarily high electricity bills and excessive generation and network 
infrastructure spending.7   
This gap is made clear by the stark difference between utility DM in Australia and the United States 
(US). In 2012, the last year for which consolidated utility energy efficiency and load management 
3 Joint SECV/DITR Demand Management Project Team (Dec 1989), Demand Management Development Program, 3 year 
Demand Management Action Plan, Information Paper No. 5, (available at: 
http://www.efa.com.au/Library/SECVDMActionPlan.pdf ) p.5. 
4 Queensland  Department of  Employment, Economic Development and Innovation,   Queensland  Energy  Management 
Plan, May 2011 
https://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2011/may/qld%20energy%20management%20plan/Attachments/Qld%20Ener
gy%20Mgt%20Plan.pdf  
5 National Grid Management Council (1992).  National Grid Protocol: First Issue . Melbourne, NGMC, p. iii 
6 Crossley, D., Demand-Side Participation in the Australian National Electricity Market: A Brief Annotated History, 
Regulatory Assistance Project, 2011, pp.8-10 
7 Dunstan, C., “A Simple Rule Change Can Save Billions for Power Networks and their Customers”, The Conversation, 13 
March 2015, https://theconversation.com/a-simple-rule-change-can-save-billions-for-power-networks-and-their-
customers-38657  
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data is available, total DM delivered over 55,000 MW (peak) to the US market, accounting for 
approximately 7% of peak demand (Figure 3). By comparison, the Australian Energy Market 
Operator’s (AEMO’s) latest forecasts of demand-side participation from 2016/17 to 2035/36 relative 
to wholesale price (Table 1), with prices above $7,500/MWh still only suggests DM capacity of 
388MW, equivalent to just over 1% of peak demand across the NEM.  
 
Figure 3. Annually reported utility DM in the US (Source: US Energy Information Administration, ISF) 
 
Table 1. AEMO estimated available demand-side participation in MW by state8 
 
In 2015, 387 electricity utilities reported demand response programs to the US Energy Information 
Administration. These utilities had a combined peak demand of about 625 GW, about 17 times peak 
demand in the Australian National Electricity Market.9 These utilities reported available and 
dispatched demand reduction from demand response of 32.9 GW or 5.3% of peak demand.   In 
addition to demand response, it is estimated that utility energy efficiency demand management 
program were delivering savings equivalent to 4.1% of retail electric sales in the United States in 
201310 and 5% in 2015.11   Therefore, existing utility demand response and energy efficiency demand 




9 US Energy Information Administration https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#summary  
10 Steven Nadel, Neal Elliott, and Therese Langer, Energy Efficiency in the United States : 35 Years and Counting (June 2015 































 Demand Management Incentives Review      June 2017            
  3 
                                                          
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 
management programs in the US are estimated to be offering peak demand reduction equivalent to 
over 55 GW or 9% of peak demand.  It should also be noted that these are only average figures and 
the best performing utilities are delivering DM outcomes more than twice this amount.  For more 
data on DM programs in the United States, please refer to Appendix E.  
If the NEM were to establish a proportionally equivalent level of DM to the US average, this would 
represent potential demand reduction of over 3000MW of demand management capacity.  This is 
equivalent to almost twice the total capacity of the recently retired 1600 MW Hazelwood coal fired 
power station and more than the combined new capacity proposed in the recent announcements by 
the South Australian Government (up to 350 MW12) and the Australian Government’s Snowy 2.0 
(estimated 2000 MW13).  The impact of providing this additional 3000 MW of DM capacity on 
reducing power prices is likely to be significant, given that removing the 1600 MW capacity of the 
Hazelwood power station will raise electricity prices by an estimated 7.2 per cent in South Australia14 
and 9 per cent across the market.15  
It is a positive sign that Australian network businesses are increasingly recognising the importance of 
supporting DM (utilising DERs such as demand response, energy efficiency, distributed generation 
and storage) as a means of providing higher value, lower cost and more reliable network services for 
consumers.  This new focus on DM is highlighted in the Energy Network Australia/CSIRO Network 
Transformation Roadmap.16  
The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) now has a unique opportunity to tap this enthusiasm, and 
redress the longstanding gap in the demand side of Australia's electricity system, through its DM 
Incentive Scheme and Innovation Allowance Mechanism.   
1.3 DM = “Duck Management”? 
The development of the AER’s DM Incentive Scheme comes at a critical time for energy networks as 
the electricity system transitions towards a greater proportion of distributed and renewable 
generation. DM is not just about providing low cost energy resources and reducing consumer energy 
bills.  It is also about ensuring reliable supply in an increasingly complex electricity system.  
The emergence of the so-called “duck curve” (as illustrated for California in Figure 4) shows the 
changing pattern of net demand on the grid as increased renewable uptake, in particular solar PV, 
may lead to over-generation at times of low load and very steep ramp-up rates to times of peak 
11 S. Nadel, Demand Response programs can reduce utilities’ peak demand an average of 10%, complementing savings from 
energy efficiency programs, http://aceee.org/blog/2017/02/demand-response-programs-can-reduce,  Blog,  February 09, 
2017 
12 Up to 250MW of temporary diesel and new gas fired generation and 100 MW of battery storage, South Australian 
Government, Our Energy Plan, http://ourenergyplan.sa.gov.au/assets/our-energy-plan-sa-web.pdf  
13  James Massola,  'Snowy Hydro 2.0': Malcolm Turnbull announces plans for $2 billion expansion, Sydney Morning Herald, 
15 March 2017 
14 Nick Harmsen, South Australian power bills to increase by $115 after Hazelwood Power Station closure , ABC News 
Online, Updated 14 Dec 2016, 6:45am,  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-14/sa-power-bills-to-rise-after-hazelwoods-
closure,-report-says/8117334  
15 Adam Morton and Brian Robins, Hazelwood closure could force power prices up, Sydney Morning Herald , 28 May 2016, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/energy/hazelwood-closure-to-force-power-prices-up-20160527-gp583e.html  
16 ENA and CSIRO, Network Transformation Roadmap, 2017, http://www.energynetworks.com.au/electricity-network-
transformation-roadmap  
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demand when solar generation softens in the evenings and air-conditioning load rises. This may have 
major impacts on the reliability of the system if demand is not managed appropriately.  
 
Figure 4. California's "duck curve” illustrating the impact of solar generation on net demand17 
 
DM has a large role to play in flattening this demand curve18, by shifting demand to fill the 
generation trough in the afternoon and to bring down the evening peak. This will be particularly 
important for certain states in Australia where the “duck curve” may be even more drastic than the 
Californian example. For instance, AEMO is forecasting South Australia’s minimum operational 
demand to plummet over the next 20 years, falling from about 30% of peak demand today to 
crossing over to negative net demand (see Figure 5). This means that from around 2029, generation 
from rooftop solar is forecast to exceed total demand on the grid, so at these times, there will be no 
need for any generation from centralised power stations.19  On the other hand, peak demand is 
forecast to continue to rise. 
 
17 California Independent System Operator (CAISO), What the duck curve tells us about managing a green grid, 2013.  
18 Or, in other words, “teaching the duck to fly” by taking on a more streamlined profile, Lazar, J. (2016). Teaching the 
“Duck” to Fly, Second Edition. Montpelier, VT: The Regulatory Assistance Project.   
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/7956    
19 South Australian 2017 peak demand: 3085MW, https://www.aer.gov.au/wholesale-markets/wholesale-
statistics/seasonal-peak-demand-occurrence-region  
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Figure 5. AEMO forecasts for South Australian minimum demand to 2036 - less than zero!20 
 
One frequently proposed response to this nationwide problem is a mass rollout of batteries.  Another 
is to build large scale hydroelectric storage such as the proposed “Snowy 2.0”.  However, any such 
one-dimensional strategy is likely to be extremely expensive, even with rapidly falling battery costs. 
The future of affordable and reliable electricity supply must include incentivising network businesses 
to implement cost effective DM solutions, in order to address system risk at least cost to consumers. 
 
20 Australian Energy Market Operator, National Electricity Forecasting Report, June 2016 
www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/Planning_and_Forecasting/NEFR/2016/2016-National-Electricity-
Forecasting-Report-NEFR.pdf  
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2 REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND DM 
2.1 Barriers to DM  
It is widely recognised that there are numerous barriers to the efficient adoption of electricity DM in 
Australia.  For example, ISF reviewed the broad barriers to DM in its report, Institutional Barriers to 
Intelligent Grid.21  A summary of the categories of barriers to DM from that report is shown in Figure 
6 below: 
 
Figure 6. Barriers to electricity DM in Australia22 
ISF also investigated these barriers further by conducting a survey of stakeholder perceptions of the 
degree to which these barriers obstruct the uptake of DM in the Australian electricity market.23 The 
results of surveying over 200 respondents are summarised in Figure 7.  The greater the degree of 
agreement that a proposed barrier does impede DM, the further to the right its position on the scale. 
(Note: the prefix letter for each listed barrier corresponds with the type of barrier listed in Figure 6.) 
It is noteworthy that regulatory barriers do not feature in the top seven perceived barriers in Figure 
7.  Furthermore, the barrier which is closest to the focus of this study, “R13. Electricity suppliers profit 
from electricity sold, DM cuts profits”, drew one of the lowest levels of agreement and one of the 
highest divergences of views between stakeholder groups.    
21 Dunstan, C. et al, Institutional Barriers to Intelligent Grid: Working Paper 4.1, 2011 
http://igrid.net.au/sites/igrid.net.au/files/images/A2SE_ISF_DM%20Barriers%20Report%20June%202011_0.pdf 
22 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, seven of the top ten barriers, (P12, B19, S4, S5, R15, P11 and I3) are directly 
related to the behaviour of the electricity suppliers.  So, while their effects may be less obvious, 
regulatory incentives that discourage utilities from undertaking DM are likely to have a powerful 
impact on limiting the uptake of DM.  
 
 Figure 7.  Barriers to DM in Australia, (in order of level of respondent agreement, 2011) 
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2.2 The DM Incentives Review 
In its 2012 Power of Choice Review, the AEMC recognised that regulatory incentives faced by 
network businesses are crucial to the development of an efficient DM market, and so it 
recommended changing the National Electricity Rules to strengthen such incentives.  The subsequent 
rule change was adopted in 201524, giving the AER responsibility for creating an effective DM 
Incentive Scheme and Innovation Allowance.   
In the context of the AER developing this new DM Incentive Scheme, the Australian Renewable 
Energy Agency (ARENA) commissioned ISF to undertake this DM Incentives Review to assess 
quantitatively the financial barriers to distribution network DM that are created by existing economic 
regulatory incentives.  This Review involved extensive consultation with a range of stakeholders 
including extensive consultation with network businesses, demand management providers, 
regulators, government and consumer representatives, including via a Study Reference Group ( see 
Appendix E).  This Report draws heavily on the two submissions that ISF made to the AER DMIS 
consultation process25.   
It should be noted that it is not the purpose of the DMIR Model and this study to examine the 
relative economic merits of DM solutions compared to network solutions.  While this is an important 
question that deserves more attention, it is not the focus of this review.  Accordingly, this review 
does not conclude or suggest that DM is always a lower-cost solution for consumers than network 
capex. Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to ask: In a range of plausible scenarios where DM could 
deliver lower cost and higher value to customers, does the current regulatory system create financial 
disincentives to choosing DM and thereby discourage network businesses from adopting DM? 
To investigate the impact of incentives, ISF developed a detailed spreadsheet model, the DMIR 
Model.  The model examined four different network constraints cases, and one network 
infrastructure solution and one DM solution for each.  The four cases were selected based on advice 
from our multi-stakeholder Study Reference Group and are set out in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Network constraint cases considered in the DM Incentives Review model  
Case  Network Constraint Network Solution  DM Solution 
1 Urban regional high 
voltage (HV) cables, 
reaching end of 
service life 
Retire aging 33kV cables – 
Replace with 132KV cable  
(capacity: 200MWp, cost: 
$300M)  
Large-scale energy efficiency and 
peak load mgt 
(capacity: 50MWp, cost: $132/kW/yr, 
5 year deferral) 
2 Over- and under-
voltage on distribution 
feeder  
Install power factor 
correction, Static VAR 
Compensation and 
Distribution Transformer 
Automatic Tap Changers  
(capacity: 0.5MWp, cost: 
$0.6M) 
Peak load mgt, local batteries and 
network support (incl. from PV 
inverters) 
(capacity: 0.5MWp, cost: $143/kW/yr, 
>27 year deferral) 
24  AEMC, National Electricity Amendment (Demand management incentive scheme) Rule 2015 No. 8,  20 August 2015, 
www.aemc.gov.au/News-Center/What-s-New/Announcements/New-rules-for-a-demand-management-incentive-scheme  
25 ISF submissions available on the AER DMIS website: www.aer.gov.au/networks-pipelines/guidelines-schemes-models-
reviews/demand-management-incentive-scheme-and-innovation-allowance-mechanism/initiation  
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3 Distribution zone 
approaching capacity 
on urban fringe 
New zone substation for new 
residential estate   
(capacity: 10MWp, cost: $30M) 
Establish mini-grid (energy 
efficiency, load mgt, PV, batteries 
& diesel back up) for new 
subdivision; maintain connection 
to main grid 
(capacity: 10MWp, cost: $113/kW/yr, 
>27 year deferral) 
4 Unreliable distribution 
feeder to community 
on rural fringe-of-grid  
 
Retire existing feeder - 
replace like for like 
(capacity: 5MWp, cost: $5M) 
Establish mini-grid (energy 
efficiency, load mgt, PV, batteries 
& diesel back up) – keep existing 
feeder as back up 
(capacity: 5MWp, cost: $113/kW/yr, 
>27 year deferral) 
The model conducts net present value benefit/cost analysis over five-year and 30-year timeframes, 
approximating a single regulatory period and a typical network asset lifetime.  
The DM solutions draw on the following decentralised energy resources: 
1. peak load management  (demand response, dynamic peak pricing, direct load control, etc.) 
2. energy efficiency   
3. battery storage 
4. dispatchable local generation 
5. (local) variable renewable generation. 
 
The regulatory parameters considered in the Model include: 
1. Key inputs: discount rate, weighted average cost of capital (WACC), tax rate, cost of debt, 
return on equity and Value of Customer Reliability (VCR) 
2. Key regulatory features:  depreciation, capital expenditure (capex) rollover to Regulatory 
Asset Base (RAB), operating expenditure (opex) recovery, reductions in expected unserved 
energy (EUSE)  
3. Incentive mechanisms including: 
• STPIS - Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme 
• EBSS -  Efficiency Benefit Sharing Scheme 
• CESS -  Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme 
4. Net market benefits (that is, benefits that accrue to stakeholders other than directly to 
distribution network businesses and their customers) including: 
• the value of avoided transmission, generation and storage capacity 
• the value of avoided carbon emissions 
• the network option value, that is, the value associated with deferring network costs 
that may be lower or avoidable in future. 
5. (Please note: These factors were estimated but are generally not included in the cost-benefit 
analysis below, except where explicitly stated.)Net market benefits that are not considered 
include: 
• the value of customer energy savings (i.e. other than distribution network charges) 
• the value of non-network reduced EUSE 
• the impacts on wholesale pool prices. 
Reflecting the complexity of the modelling task, there are many assumptions about both data and 
mathematical relationships in this modelling.  The network constraints and solutions used in the 
model are hypothetical, but ISF drew on real world references and precedents wherever available.   
Within the limited time available and budget constraints of the project, ISF endeavoured to apply 
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transparent and unbiased estimates.  To allow stakeholders to consider, understand, and challenge 
these assumptions, ISF has made the full DMIR model freely and publicly available on request, as 
outlined at the beginning of this report.    
There are numerous remaining relevant and interesting issues that ISF would like to examine further 
if time and resources were available.  For example, the treatment in the model of the Service Target 
Performance Incentive Scheme (STPIS) and expected unserved energy (EUSE), though adequate for 
this analysis (as the reliability of DM and network solutions are assumed to be equivalent), is 
rudimentary and would benefit from refinement for future analysis. 
2.3 Modelling Results  
The outputs of the model focused on: 
• the benefits and costs accruing to customers 
• the revenue, costs and net profit accruing to the network businesses 
• the return on assets for network businesses.26  
These values were calculated for both the network (capex) solution and the DM (opex) solution, 
using a baseline of no action to address the network constraint as the common point of reference.  
These two perspectives (network businesses and customers) and two solutions (network capex and 
DM opex) were then presented in graphical format for each of the four cases and for both five-year 
and 30-year time horizons. An example of these graphs is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Network capex vs. DM opex benefit-cost analysis      
 (Case 1: 30 year perspective, without DM full cost recovery) 
Further detail on the DM Incentives Review scope is included in Appendix A.  A screenshot of the 
model dashboard is included in Appendix B.  Appendix C includes a summary of the results of the 
26 The return on assets for network businesses was calculated as a modified internal rate of return for network business 
over 30 years based on equity invested, equity returned and net profit received, using the regulated nominal pre-tax return 
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modelling for each case both, without a DM incentive, and with key sensitivity analyses of estimates 
of break-even levels for the DM Incentive Payment needed to neutralise the current regulatory bias. 
As illustrated in Figure 8, in Case 1 for the 30-year horizon, the DM opex solution delivers lower costs 
and higher net benefits ($128.3 million) to customers than the network capex solution ($92.8 
million).  If the regulatory system was working efficiently, then the network business should be 
incentivised to adopt the DM solution to the network constraint.  However, from the network 
business’s perspective, the network capex solution is the more profitable option ($44.6 million net 
profit compared to only $25.8 million net profit for the DM opex solution).  If return on equity for the 
network business is considered as the decisive parameter, instead of net profit, this also favours the 
network capex solution (4.9%), compared to the DM opex solution (4.7%).  All of the above values 
exclude the additional value of “net market benefits” that DM can provide (see Section 2.4). 
A similar pattern of “what is good for distribution network businesses is bad for customers” is 
observed in two of the four network constraint case studies (over 30 years), if net market benefits 
are excluded, and in all four case studies (over 30 years) if net market benefits are included. This 
suggests a significant bias in favour of network capex solutions and against DM opex solutions.  
For the five-year analysis horizon, the distribution network business’ net profit is higher for the 
network capex solution than for the DM opex solution for all four network constraint cases.  As is the 
case for the 30 year horizon, the net benefits for consumers from the DM opex solution are superior 
to the network capex solution in all four cases if net market benefits are included, and higher in two 
of the four cases if net market benefits are excluded ($17.9 million as illustrated in Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Network capex vs. DM opex benefit-cost analysis     
 (Case 1: 5 year perspective, without DM full cost recovery) 
To test sensitivity to differing inputs, ISF also varied a range of parameters relating to:  
• higher or lower DM costs (and consequently whether network capex is more or less 
expensive than the DM solution) 
• higher or lower debt to equity ratios.  
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In summary, the modelling found strong evidence that there are significant financial barriers to 
network DM in the current regulatory structure.  These barriers were found to include: 
a. A bias in favour of capex e.g. network infrastructure, relative to opex 
b. Less favourable treatment of DM opex recovery, compared to capex and other opex 
c. An exclusion of future “option value” when considering DM solutions.  For example, 
undertaking DM to defer expensive network capex may lead to major savings in the future if 
demand conditions change so that the network capex is no longer required.   
(Note that this third barrier is not an intrinsic element of the current regulatory system, but a 
consequence of how the current regulations are applied.) 
The first two barriers are discussed briefly below, while option value is discussed in Section 2.4. 
The impact of the capex bias depends largely on the extent to which the regulated cost of capital 
exceeds the actual cost of capital.  This bias may be significant, and is often the most contentious 
issue in regulatory determinations conducted by the AER.  This often takes the form of debates about 
the appropriate weighted cost of capital (WACC).  Indeed, the tendency for monopoly economic 
regulation to be biased in favour of capex, and to encourage excessive capex, has been an area of 
lively debate at least since the 1960s. 27  However, it was beyond the scope of this study to 
investigate this element of capex bias. 
The most significant barrier appears to be the relatively unfavourable treatment of cost recovery for 
DM opex relative to network capex and other non-DM network opex.  Capex cost recovery is based 
on the principle of the network business putting a capex proposal to the AER and the AER assessing 
the proposal on its merits. If the capex is deemed prudent, the full value of the capex, plus a return 
on capital, is allowed to be recovered.  On the other hand, DM opex, like other opex, is based on 
modified extrapolation of past expenditure, the so-called “base-step-trend” approach.  However, 
because DM opex has generally been very small in past expenditure, this tends to perpetuate low 
DM expenditure.  The network business can argue to the AER for a specific “step change” in DM 
opex, but this in turn involves another process for the network business to work through in order to 
justify DM opex which creates more uncertainty about DM cost recovery.       
A second dimension of the unfavourable treatment of DM opex cost recovery relates to how it is 
justified. Typically, network capex is justifiable where it is shown to cost-effectively improve customer 
reliability and reduce expected unserved energy (EUSE).  By contrast, DM opex is typically only 
justifiable where it is shown to cost-effectively avoid or defer network capex. This makes DM 
subordinate to the higher-priority network capex solution, and it does not allow the two solutions to 
be compared equally, according to their ability to meet customer needs. This is an important 
distinction. There are likely to be very many instances where DM can create value for network 
customers by improving reliability and reducing unserved energy, well in advance of the time when 
new large and “lumpy” network infrastructure would be cost effective.  A requirement that network 
DM can only be justified where it defers or avoids specific network capex denies customers access to 
better service and lower costs.  
It should be recognised that the current regulatory structure does allow partial delayed cost recovery 
for DM opex in the subsequent regulatory period, so long as DM opex occurs in the forecast base 
year. However, our modelling found that, allowing for the time value of money associated with this 
delayed cost recovery and other offsetting factors via the EBSS, the effective level of DM opex cost 
27 See for example, Averch, Harvey; Johnson, Leland L. (1962). "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint”,  American Economic Review. 52 (5): 1052–1069.   
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recovery was only about two-thirds of the actual DM opex cost. For example, in network constraint 
Case 1, the net present value of the DM opex costs was $14.1 million while the net present value of 
the DM opex cost recovery was $8.2 million. The impact of this limited cost recovery is illustrated 
below.  
 
Figure 10. Network capex vs. DM opex benefit-cost analysis      
 (Case 1: 30 year perspective, without full DM cost recovery) 
 
 
Figure 11. Network capex vs. DM opex benefit-cost analysis      
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Figure 10 shows the net profit for the network business undertaking DM opex in the current 
regulatory structure (net profit $25.8 million) and Figure 11 shows the net profit with full cost 
recovery of DM opex (net profit $31.4 million)28. 
2.4  DM bias and net market benefits  
In addition to the above regulatory barriers for network businesses, the exclusion of net market 
benefits also creates a barrier to network DM. Among these excluded net market benefits are: 
1. the costs associated with transmission, generation and storage capacity that may be avoided 
as a result of network DM reducing peak demand.  These avoided costs may manifest in 
lower electricity pool prices, less chance of shortage of supply in peak periods, and the option 
value associated with potentially avoidable future transmission, generation and storage costs 
2. the costs associated with avoided carbon emissions 
3. network option value.  
Given the current lively public debates about billions of dollars of new expenditure (including 
possible public and customer funding for proposed new interstate transmission, gas-fired generation 
and battery storage capacity) and debates around carbon emissions abatement29, it is crucial that the 
AER look beyond distribution network impacts and consider these net market benefits of establishing 
the DMIS. Indeed, as net market benefits are explicitly referred to in the DMIS Rule, it is appropriate 
that the AER consider such net market benefits in balancing the incentives between expenditure on 
network options and DM options.30 
In addition to examining the differences in the impacts of DM opex and network capex on network 
businesses’ profits and customer net benefits, this study also analysed the relative impact of the 
estimated net market benefits of DM.  As there is uncertainty about how to estimate the value of 
these net market benefits, ISF has tried to take a conservative approach to estimating these values, 
and probably understates their true value.  The approach to setting these values is discussed in 
Section 3.8.   
It would be very helpful for the AER to provide guidance on calculating the value of these net market 
benefits as part of its DMIS guidelines.  This would be particularly relevant to network businesses 
that are proposing DM measures for the DMIS, as it would enable them to quantify more easily and 
consistently the expected net benefits to consumers. 
The impact of neglecting the option value of network DM could also be very significant and is 
particularly relevant in the context of the reported over-investment in network capacity by some 
network businesses in recent years.31  Although it was also beyond the scope of the study to 
investigate option value in detail, an estimate of network option value was included in the modelling, 
as described in Section 3.8. 
28 While this still falls short of the $44.6 million net profit for the network capex solution, this additional cost recovery is 
sufficient to make the DM opex solution more attractive than the network capex solution if allowance is made for the 
higher assumed NPV cost of equity for the network capex solution.  
 
29 See for example The Finkel Review, http://www.environment.gov.au/energy/national-electricity-market-review  
30 AEMC, National Electricity Rules (Version 92), Section 6.6.3c. www.aemc.gov.au/Energy-Rules/National-electricity-
rules/Current-Rules  
31 Hill, J., “The great energy spend that is costing us billions”, The Drum, ABC Online, 12 Nov 2015 
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-10/hill-the-great-energy-con-that-is-costing-us-billions/6924272  
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2.5 Disaggregating the elements of bias against DM 
In order to illuminate the drivers of the bias described above, ISF undertook further analysis to 
disaggregate the components of the difference in net profit result for the network capex and DM 
opex solutions.   As noted above, our modelling found this difference to be $18.7 million in Case 1. In 
other words, the network capex solution was $18.7 million more profitable than the DM opex 
solution for the network business.  This difference is shown as the smaller of the two black rectangles 
in Figure 12 below.  The red bars represent factors that contribute to a higher net profit for the 
network capex relative to the DM opex solution, and in contrast, the green bars indicate factors 
which favour the profitability of the DM opex solution.  
 
Figure 12. Disaggregation of drivers of higher net profit for network capex in Case 1  
 
The largest drivers favouring the DM opex solution are: 
• the CESS (Capital Expenditure Savings Scheme), which effectively means the 
distribution network business is not permitted to recover from customers all of 
the additional $300 million in network capex spending  
• DM opex cost recovery, via AER’s normal base-step-trend opex forecasting 
mechanism 
• tax, which offsets the increased profit of the network capex options. 
The major drivers for higher net profit for the network capex solution are: 
• the cost of the DM opex solution, of which only about two-thirds is recovered 
via DM cost recovery  
• allowed return on equity (pre-tax).  However, this is largely offset by tax (paid 
out of the gross profits) and the assumed cost of equity (paid out of net profits);  
• greater cost recovery of interest on debt  
• savings in non-DM opex (net of cost recovery) 
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• the EBSS (Efficiency Benefits Sharing Scheme) as described above. 
As noted in Figure 6, there are other important barriers to network DM beyond the regulatory 
incentives considered by this DM Incentives Review.  It is likely that the existing regulatory 
disincentives to DM have helped to entrench and reinforce these other non-regulatory barriers, and 
that a well-designed DM Incentive Scheme would help to redress these other barriers over time.   
This review does not provide a complete analysis of all potential biases against DM that are 
relevant to the AER’s deliberations.  For example, this modelling does not take account of the 
following potential biases: 
• Opex cost pass through is largely based on actual expenditure, via the base-step-trend opex 
forecasting approach, while capex pass through is largely based on regulatory estimates of 
the cost of capital.  This may give the distribution network business more capacity to increase 
profit via capex rather than opex. for example: 
o Cost of debt may be less than that assumed by the regulatory model. 
o Cost of equity may be lower than that assumed by the regulatory model. 
• Cultural preferences within the distribution network business for network capex over DM 
opex, due to for example: 
o greater familiarity and organisational expertise with network capex solutions 
o greater confidence in the network capex solution to perform as expected 
o greater familiarity and confidence with the cost recovery mechanism for network 
capex 
o an expectation that DM is only a stop gap measure, and that a network capex 
solution “will ultimately be needed anyway” 
o a concern that delaying the network capex solution could lead to increased costs in 
easement acquisition, materials, labour, etc.  
o concerns about customer engagement, how to value DM cost and benefits, and how 
to share these with customers.   
 
As a minimum, the AER should use the DM Incentive Scheme to remove the existing regulatory 
barriers.  However, the AER should also ensure that the DM incentive is high enough to address 
rapidly the other non-regulatory barriers to DM.   Our analysis indicates that there is ample scope to 
do this, while at the same time ensuring that customers can still receive major net benefits from 
network DM.  
 
Our analysis has identified significant barriers to network DM both in the regulatory structure and 
elsewhere. However, we do not find that these barriers are an intrinsic or necessary feature of the 
electricity market.  Accordingly, if the DM Incentive Scheme can effectively address these barriers in 
the short to medium term (say, over two five-year regulatory periods), then the DM Incentive 
Scheme will not need to be a permanent feature of the regulatory regime. 
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3 DESIGNING THE DM INCENTIVE SCHEME 
3.1 Principles and metrics for a DM Incentive Scheme 
The DM Incentive Scheme should recognise (and monetise) the value that network DM creates for 
customers by reducing overall network charges and costs of electricity supply.  In this respect, the 
DM Incentive Scheme would be analogous to the existing Efficiency Benefits Sharing Scheme (EBSS), 
the Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS) and the Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme 
(STPIS), which also offer financial benefits to network businesses in return for delivering greater 
benefits to consumers.  
In support of the scheme assessment criteria in the National Electricity Rules, the following principles 
for the DM Incentive Scheme are proposed. The DM Incentive Scheme should: 
1. maximise long-term benefits for consumers 
2. enhance competition, in particular by allowing DM to compete fairly with network options 
3. recognise that there are regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to efficient network DM 
4. ensure that DM incentives are sufficient to develop an effective and efficient DM market 
5. encourage efficient delivery of DM 
6. require transparent and consistent information provision and reporting 
7. include a holistic consideration of all relevant benefits, including net market benefits beyond 
those directly related to the distribution network businesses. 
Relevant net market benefits that should be considered include: 
• the value of deferred or avoided of transmission, generation and storage capacity (including 
the option value of potentially avoidable future network, generation and storage costs); and 
• the value of avoided carbon emissions. 
As the dominant driver of costs for electricity network businesses is annual peak demand, the 
primary performance measure for the DM Incentive Scheme should be reducing annual peak 
demand on the network.  Accordingly, ISF proposes a performance-based DM incentive payment 
structured as dollars per kilowatt (or kilovolt amp) of peak demand reduction per year, that is, 
$/kWpeak per year, or $/kVApeak per year. 
However, the AER has also argued that a “DM Cost Uplift”, that pays the network business in 
proportion to DM expenditure rather than in proportion to peak demand, may be more flexible, offer 
greater certainty to network businesses and be easier for the AER to administer.32   While ISF 
considers the performance-based DMIP to be more directly linked to demand reduction and value 
created, the DM Cost Uplift could also be effective, provided it is accompanied with appropriate 
performance reporting and accountability, particularly regarding delivery of net benefits to 
consumers. 
32 See for example: AER, Options Day Slide Pack, 6 April 2017,  www.aer.gov.au/system/files/AER%20-
%20Slide%20pack%20-%20Demand%20Management%20Options%20Day%20-%206%20April%202017.pdf  
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Other performance metrics that will be useful for monitoring network DM performance are outlined 
in Section 3.7.  
Given the significance of the imbalance in DM opex cost recovery in the current regulatory structure, 
it is crucial that the AER directly addresses this issue in the context of implementing the DM Incentive 
Scheme.  To encourage all cost-effective forms of network DM, in both the short and long term, ISF 
recommends that the AER adopt the following “two-pronged” approach in implementing the 
Scheme: 
1. Normalising DM cost recovery:  This approach treats proposed DM expenditure in the network 
business’s five-yearly regulatory proposal on the same terms as capex and non-DM opex.  
2. A DM incentive:  This approach involves offering a financial benefit to network businesses that 
recognise the value that DM delivers to customers in reducing overall network charges and costs 
of electricity supply.   
3.2 Normalising DM cost recovery 
The DM incentive Scheme should not be regarded solely as an incentive payment to respond to 
existing biases and barriers to DM.  Rather, the DM Incentive Scheme should be developed as part of 
a coordinated strategy to encourage cost-effective DM as a normal part of running a network 
business, that is, as normal business expenditure.  Such an approach would involve the AER treating 
DM opex initiatives proposed in the network business’s five-yearly regulatory proposal on an 
equitable basis with capex and non-DM opex.  
To implement this approach, the AER should encourage each distribution network business to 
develop a detailed five-year DM Plan as part of its regulatory proposal.  A DM Plan should identify 
DM solutions to network constraints and provide a business case to demonstrate the solutions’ cost 
effectiveness.  Cost effectiveness could be demonstrated either by reference to avoided or deferred 
network capex or by reference to other factors that are conventionally used to justify network capex 
or non-DM opex.  These other factors could include specific, quantified customer benefits in service 
improvements, reliability or reduced expected unserved energy.   
Given that this is a new approach to planning DM, the AER should give clear, timely guidance to 
network businesses on what information is required for DM Plans. Information requirements should 
be no more onerous than for other proposed network expenditure. 
DM Plans should include both price-based DM and non price-based DM.  There should be no cap on 
the allowable cost of DM in aggregate, or on a $/kW per year basis, but all DM measures included 
should be cost effective and should demonstrate net benefits to consumers.  DM Plans should be 
subject to the same review processes as other proposed capex and opex.   It is recognised that the 
AER may need to draw on specialised DM consulting expertise to undertake such DM expenditure 
reviews, just as it does for the capex and opex expenditure reviews. 
If the AER approves the proposed DM expenditure (for example as an alternative to a more costly 
network capex solution), the associated DM opex should be added to the network allowable opex for 
the forthcoming regulatory period.  In cases where the proposed DM expenditure is rejected, the 
cost of the network capex solution should be added to the network business’s allowable capex.  
(Such capex should, of course, be subject the normal expenditure review process.) 
A network business should be able to receive the DM incentive both for DM projects included in its 
DM Plan and for DM projects not included in its DM Plan.  However, DM projects not included in its 
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DM Plan should be subject to a separate test in order to determine whether the project delivers net 
benefits to consumers.  
While normalising DM opex and requiring DM Plans will help to address the unequal treatment of 
DM opex relative to other opex cost recovery, it will do little to address the capex/opex bias and 
other non-regulatory barriers.  Furthermore, given that the scale of such DM Plans will likely be 
modest at least initially, normalising DM opex and requiring DM Plans would do little to realise the 
net market benefits of network DM.  For these reasons, a separate DM incentive is required.   
3.3 Proposed structure of a DM incentive  
The DM incentive should be structured either: 
• as a performance-based DM “Incentive Payment” (DMIP), in terms of dollars per kilowatt of 
peak demand reduction per year; that is, $/kWpeak per year or $/kVApeak per year; or 
• as a DM “Cost Uplift” (DMCU), in terms of dollars of additional cost recovery, proportional to 
the cost to the distribution network business of the DM solution. 
Of these two options, the DM cost uplift option is more consistent with existing AER processes, and 
may therefore seem easier to administer.  However, the DM cost uplift is also less directly linked to 
efficient DM outcomes.  If the AER chooses this option, it will need to ensure that there are effective 
monitoring and reporting arrangements in place to ensure the DM solutions adopted also deliver net 
benefits to consumers.  
As noted in Section 2.3, one of the advantages of DM is its ability to be deployed more flexibly, in 
smaller “lumps” and with shorter lead times in response to changing demand conditions.  It is 
therefore impractical and inefficient to expect networks to plan all DM activity up to 6 years in 
advance in their five-yearly DM Plans.  This is particularly relevant where network businesses 
currently have limited experience and expertise in procuring network DM, and where technology is 
evolving rapidly.  Therefore, the DM incentive should also be available to support DM with a short 
planning lead time.   
3.4 Setting the level of the DM incentive 
A DM incentive should be set at a level which is high enough to motivate the network businesses to 
implement cost-effective network DM (without which there would be no benefits to share with 
customers), but low enough to deliver significant net benefits to consumers.  It is not possible to 
determine an “ideal level” in advance, as the net benefits available from DM in each case depend on 
many variables, including the nature of the network constraint and cost of the available network and 
DM solutions.   
It would be cumbersome, costly and inefficient to determine the appropriate level of the DM 
incentive for each network constraint, in each location, for each network business.  It is therefore 
likely to be more practical and efficient to stipulate a uniform DM incentive at a default level for all 
DM in all network territories for the duration of the forthcoming network regulatory determinations 
(2019–2025). 
Therefore, in setting the DM incentive, the AER will need to balance these competing demands by 
selecting a DM incentive that is high enough to maximise the implementation of cost-effective DM in 
the first place, but which is also as low as possible to maximise the share of DM benefits that accrues 
to consumers.    
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One relatively straightforward approach for setting a DM incentive would be to apply the same 
proportional benefit sharing as currently applies to the EBSS and the CESS – that is, about 30% share 
to network business and about 70% to customers.  Since the DM Incentive Scheme should aim to 
encourage cost-effective DM, the average cost of DM would be expected to be no more than the 
average cost of network capacity.     
Setting the value for a DM Incentive Payment  
The following example illustrates how this 30:70 value share approach could be applied to setting the 
value of a DM Incentive Payment.   
 
Illustration:  Calculating value of a DM Incentive Payment, using 30:70 value share rule of thumb 
The long-run average cost of network capacity (measured in $/kWpeak per year) can be estimated by dividing 
the total annual cost of providing network services (that is, total annual network revenue) by the peak 
demand being served each year.  Based on the total annual network revenue and annual peak demand, the 
long-run average cost of capacity for New South Wales distribution network businesses ranges from 
$170/kWpeak per year for Endeavour Energy, to about $330/kWpeak per year for Essential Energy, with a 
weighted average of $250 kWpeak per year.  Applying the 30% network share of these avoided costs gives a 
range of approximately $50 to $100/kWpeak per year and an average of about $75/kWpeak per year.  The 
figures for other states and territories will vary, but are likely to fit broadly within the NSW range.  
This provides a plausible indication of the scale of a DM incentive payment. 
 
A more sophisticated way to estimate the appropriate level for the DMIP is to calculate the “break-
even level” of the DMIP which would mean that the Network Capex solution and the DM Opex 
solution would be equally financially attractive to the distribution network business.  We have used 
the DMIP Model to calculate these levels for each of the four modelled network constraints.  
However, a key question is break-even in what? There are different possible measures for financial 
neutrality for distribution network businesses.  The most obvious of these is “net profit”. That is: 
what level of DMIP would be required that ensure that the distribution network business receives 
the same level of post-tax profit for the DM opex solution as for the network capex solution?  These 
values are shown in the “Medium” column in Table 3 below, and range from $62 to $119/kW per 
year (average $87/kW per year).  
However, the net profit measure overlooks the fact that the distribution network businesses 
generally need to invest more in the network capex solutions than in the DM opex, and shareholders 
will expect to earn a competitive financial return on this additional equity. Unlike debt servicing and 
depreciation, this Return on Equity (RoE) is paid out of post-tax profit.  So if we adjust the net profit 
to account for this additional RoE in both the network capex and DM opex solutions, then the break-
even DMIP for “Net Profit less Return on in Equity” falls to a range of between $16 and $59/kW per 
year (average $38/kW per year).  This is shown in the “Low” column in Table 3.   
It is important to note that there are several key reasons why this level should be considered too low 
for a DMIP.  These reasons include: 
• It makes no provision for the value of net market benefits. 
• It does nothing to overcome cultural and other non-regulatory barriers to DM. 
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• It assumes that the regulated return on equity is set appropriately, even though regulators 
and customer advocates have often asserted that the regulated return on equity has 
generally been set too high.  
• The stipulated DMIP level should set a cap on the scale of the DMIP, allowing distribution 
network businesses to claim a lower level where this would deliver net benefits to 
consumers. Setting an excessively low DMIP will foreclose on distribution network 
businesses’ capacity and willingness to deliver such benefits to consumers in many cases.   
Towards the other end of the scale, the DMIP could be set at a level that provides for a simple break-
even of “Net Profit less Return on in Equity”, but then aim to compensate for other DM barriers by 
allowing  distribution network businesses to capture all of the value of net market benefits.  This 
approach provides the “High” break-even point, as shown in Table 3, ranging from $110 and 
$133/kW per year (average $122/kW per year).  This level of a DMIP should be regarded as too high 
as it means that consumers will not receive any share of the value of net market benefits (even 
though customers may still gain some net benefits from avoided distribution costs, as in Case 1 and 
Case 3).  
Based on this analysis, a reasonable range for the DMIS would be between the upper bound of the 
“Low” level ($59/kW per year) and the lower bound of the “High” range ($110/kW per year) as 
highlighted in green and pink below. 
Table 3: DM Incentive Payment break-even levels to neutralise bias and deliver consumer benefits  
 
Distribution network business: 
Net profit break-even 
Customers:  
Net benefit break-even 
Case 
Low: 
(Net Profit – 




(Profit - RoE + 
Net Mkt Ben)  
Excluding    
Net Market 
Benefits 
Including    
Net Market 
Benefits 
1 $16 $83 $133 $145 $291 
2 $59 (max) $83 $130 0 (-$24) $57 
3 $37 $119 $114 $122 $206 
4 $40 $62 $110 (min) 0 (-$19) $60 
Avg $38 $87 $122 $56 $154 
 
Our analysis also evaluated the break-even point for the DMIP where the net benefits to customers 
from the DM Solution, excluding and including net market benefits, are equal to the net benefits to 
customers for the network capex solution.  Below this level for the DMIP, customers will benefit from 
DM and above this level customers will lose.  These values are shown in the right hand column of the 
Table 3.  Across our four cases, the break-even level for a DMIP varies as follows33: 
• between zero and $121/kWpeak per year, if net market benefits are excluded  
• between $20 and $278/kWpeak per year, if net market benefits are included.   
We also calculated the break-even if full DM cost recovery is applied, as follows: 
• between zero and $121/kWpeak, if net market benefits are excluded   
33 For more information, please refer to Appendix C. 
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• between zero and $278/kWpeak, if net market benefits are included.  
This indicates a lower DM incentive will be required if full cost recovery of DM is applied. So as DM 
cost recovery is normalised, the need for a DM incentive is reduced.  Conversely, if DM full cost 
recovery is not applied, a higher DM incentive is warranted to account for net market benefits in the 
assessment. 
For details of these calculations see Appendix C.   
Please note that, provided the requirement that the network business demonstrate net customer 
benefit is applied, the higher end of the above ranges is arguably more relevant than the lower end 
in setting the DMIP.  For cases with a customer net benefit of zero, this implies that the DM Solution 
is more expensive than the network capex solution, so a net customer benefit for DM does not exist. 
In such cases, providing a DM incentive would not be justified, regardless of the stipulated maximum 
level of the DM Incentive Payment.   
Based on the available evidence and ISF’s analysis of a range of network constraints, a DM Incentive 
Payment should be set somewhere in the range from $50 to $100/kWpeak per year in order to 
stimulate cost-effective network DM while ensuring significant net benefits are still delivered to  
customers. 
Anecdotal feedback, during the consultation around this study, also suggested that a DMIP below 
$40 to $50 /kWpeak per year (roughly 20% of the average cost of distribution network services) would 
be unlikely to motivate network business to actively support DM.    
A DMIP at this $50 to $100/kWpeak per year level would also be broadly consistent with the level for 
DM incentives in other jurisdictions.  For example, in Ontario, the peak demand-related component 
of their conservation and demand management (CDM) incentive ranges between CAD$13.50 and 
CAD$81/kWpeak per year.34 
 
Setting the value for a DM Cost Uplift  
The AER has indicated through the DMIS consultation process, its interest in a DM Cost Uplift 
(DMCU), as an alternative to a DMIP.  To assist the AER’s deliberations, ISF undertook a similar 
analysis to our DMIS assessment, to estimate an appropriate level for a DMCU as a percentage of the 
cost of the DM measure to the distribution network business. 
The results of this analysis for break-even from the distribution network business’s perspective are:  
• the “Low” DMCU ranges from 27% to 41%  (average 34%). 
• the “Medium” DMCU ranges from 55% to 141% of the cost of DM to the distribution network 
business  (average 90%). 
• the “High” DMCU ranges from 91% to 223% (average 128%). 
The results for each network constraint case are summarised in Error! Reference source not found..   
34 Macdonald, C. , Power Stream Application for a CDM Performance Incentive Payment to Ontario Energy Board, 2016 
http://www.rds.ontarioenergyboard.ca/webdrawer/webdrawer.dll/webdrawer/rec/526430/view/   
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Across the four cases, the customers’ break-even level for a DMCU (the level at which the net 
benefits to customers from the DM solution equal those from the network capex solution) varies as 
follows: 
• between zero and 251%, if net market benefits are excluded   
• between 40% and 503%, if net market benefits are included.   
 
Table 4: Breakeven levels for DM Cost Uplift to neutralise bias and to deliver benefits to consumers 
 
Distribution network business perspective: 
Net profit break-even 
Customers perspective:  
Net benefit break-even 
Case 
Low: 
(Net Profit – 




(Profit - RoE + 
Net Mkt Ben)  
Excluding    
Net Market 
Benefits 
Including    
Net Market 
Benefits 
1 27% 141% 223% 251% 503% 
2 41% (max) 58% 91% (min) 0 (-17%) 40% 
3 33% 106% 101% 108% 183% 
4 36% 55% 97% 0 (-17%) 53% 
Avg 34% 90% 128% 81% 195% 
 
Our analysis suggests that a DMCU should be set in the range 40% to 90% of the cost of DM to the 
distribution network business, and should be subject to demonstrating a net benefit to consumers 
(including net market benefits).  
 
The above figures represent a fairly wide range of possible incentive values across the differing 
network constraint cases. In part, this reflects the wide diversity of the network constraints 
deliberately chosen to test the limits of the modelling.  Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that there 
is ample scope to provide a DM incentive that is high enough to motivate network business to 
undertake cost effective DM, while still leaving significant net benefits of DM to accrue to customers.  
This is particularly so if the DM incentive, in the form of either a DMIP or a DMCU, is only payable to 
network businesses to the extent that they demonstrate a net benefit to consumers.    
This proposed approach would effectively make the stipulated level of the DM incentive a maximum 
level contingent on consumers benefiting. In cases where the value of the DM incentive outweighs 
the expected net benefits to consumers, network businesses should be permitted to recover less 
than the stipulated level of the DMIP.   This approach ensures a net benefit to consumers, so the risk 
of consumers being left worse off is minimal. 
3.5 Timing of delivery and recovery of the DM incentive  
As noted in Section 3.2, the DM incentive should be payable both for DM proposed as part of the 
distribution network businesses five-yearly determination and for DM developed and implemented 
outside of the determination process.  To the extent that DM projects are currently proposed and 
justified outside the determination process, there is already partial cost recovery of DM costs via the 
Base-Step-Trend opex forecasting mechanism and through the operation of the CESS and EBSS.  If the 
DM incentive is established along the lines proposed in this report, then the shortfall in cost recovery 
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in these mechanisms will be redressed.  The payment of the DM incentive (be it a DMIP or a DMCU) 
for such DM should be facilitated annually through a revenue uplift adjustment, as part of the annual 
network tariff approval process.   
Making annual payments would involve more administration for both the network businesses and 
the AER, than a one-off five-yearly payment, but in order to develop the expertise and understanding 
of network DM across the sector, and to deliver the benefits of DM to customers without undue 
delay or uncertainty, such additional effort is warranted. 
To the extent that network DM projects are included in network businesses’ five-yearly DM Plans and 
accepted by the AER in its determinations, DM costs can be recovered through the normal annual 
network revenue requirements and the DM incentive could also be recovered through this process. 
This would provide an added incentive to develop DM as a normal part of network planning and 
operation.  
3.6 Including price-based DM 
Some of the most effective, low cost and innovative DM measures will include a combination of both 
price-based DM and non price-based DM.  Such efficient approaches to DM should be encouraged by 
the DM Incentive Scheme, rather than excluded.  Applying the proposed two-pronged approach, of 
normalising DM opex cost recovery and applying the DM incentive, removes any need to preclude 
price-based DM from the scheme.  It is anticipated that most price-based DM would largely be 
covered in the proposed DM Plans, and would complement the network business’s existing Cost 
Reflective Network Pricing strategy.   
3.7 Information and reporting requirements 
As noted above, ISF recommends that the DM incentive be structured as a DMIP in the form of 
dollars per kilowatt (or kilovolt amp) of peak demand reduction per year; that is, $/kWpeak per year or 
$/kVApeak per year. 
Accordingly, performance reporting based on this metric will be critical.  Other performance metrics 
that will be useful for monitoring network DM performance include: 
• cumulative (i.e. year on year) peak demand reduction 
• cost of DM measures (annual and cumulative) 
• avoided cost of network (annual and cumulative) 
• energy saved (MWh) 
• customer bills savings 
• impact on reliability (expected and actual unserved energy) 
• carbon emissions reduction  
• customer satisfaction  
• value of associated net market benefits. 
 
If the AER instead opts to apply a DM Cost Uplift, collecting data such as this will be less directly 
applicable to the payment of the DM incentive, but will still be critical for accountability in 
demonstrating effectiveness and value for money.   
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3.8 Estimating the value of net market benefits 
Using the DMIS to allow distribution network businesses to share in the value of net market benefits 
was advocated by the AEMC in its 2012 Power of Choice Report and is referred to in the DMIS Rule.35  
This section sets out how some key net market benefits have been quantified in the DMIR Model and 
how a similar quantification could be applied to the DMIS itself.  
In its modelling, ISF has attributed values for the following net market benefits: 
 
1. Value of avoided transmission capacity (and the associated option value) 
The average value for avoided transmission capacity can be approximated by dividing the total 
transmission network business revenue by the peak demand served by these businesses.  
Alternatively, other estimates are available, such as the one calculated for incremental 
transmission cost in the report, Building our Savings.36  This figure is $950/kVApeak.  Once 
amortised over 30 years, this equates to $70/kW per year.  However, there is no guarantee that 
the local network constraint will occur at precisely the same time as the constraint on the 
transmission network. In the absence of available data, we have assumed an arbitrary peak 
demand diversity factor of 50% between distribution and transmission constraints.  This reduces 
the avoided transmission cost to $35/kW per year.  ISF used this figure in the model.  
A strong case can be made for extending the DM Incentive Scheme to apply to transmission 
networks as well as distribution network businesses, but this is not included in the National 
Electricity Rules at present.  If an effective and appropriate DM Incentive Scheme were also to 
apply to transmission network businesses, then there would be no need to include a net market 
benefit value for transmission capacity in setting the DM Incentive Scheme for distribution 
networks.  Until this occurs, it is appropriate to include a value for avoided transmission capacity 
in the DMIS for distribution network businesses. 
2. Value of avoided generation (and storage) capacity (and the associated option value)  
The value of avoided generation (and storage) capacity provides a proxy for: 
• the value of reduced expected unserved energy (EUSE) in the wholesale energy market; and  
• the impacts on wholesale pool price and consequently retail energy prices. 
 
It was a concern over the lack of an efficient DM market in the National Electricity Market 
wholesale market that led the COAG Energy Council to request a rule change to create a 
“Demand Response Mechanism”.37  The failure to implement this rule change suggests that the 
underlying inefficiency remains.  
35 AEMC, National Electricity Rules (Version 92), Section 6.6.3c. www.aemc.gov.au/Energy-Rules/National-electricity-
rules/Current-Rules  
36 Langham, E., Dunstan, C.,Walgenwitz, G., Denvir, P., Lederwasch, A., and Landler, J. 2010,  BUILDING OUR SAVINGS: 
Reduced Infrastructure Costs from Improving Building Energy Efficiency.  Prepared for the Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney and Energetics., 
https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/16813/1/2010003238OK.pdf  
37 AEMC, Demand Response Mechanism and Ancillary Services Unbundling: Final Determination 
http://www.aemc.gov.au/Rule-Changes/Demand-Response-Mechanism/Final/AEMC-Documents/Information-sheet-
%E2%80%93-Final-determination.aspx  
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There are many ways to estimate the value of avoided generation capacity.  For the purposes of 
the DMIR Model, ISF used an estimated capital cost of open cycle gas turbines.  This is estimated 
at $725 /kVApeak.38 Once amortised over 30 years, and subject to an assumed 50% peak demand 
diversity factor compared to distribution networks constraints, this equates to $27/kW/yr. 
It should be noted that the above estimates of the net market benefits of generation and 
transmission capacity are provided for illustrative purposes.  It was beyond the scope of this 
study to provide more definitive figures.  Accordingly, the above values are indicative and 
probably conservative, and may represent a significant underestimate of the true value of net 
market benefits.  By way of comparison, it is instructive to consider the benchmark values of 
generation and transmission capacity as applied in the Western Australian electricity capacity 
market, which suggest a combined generation and transmission capacity value of more than 
$110/kW per annum, which is significantly higher than the combined value estimated above of 
$62/kW per annum.  
 
Figure 13 Benchmark capacity values applied in Western Australian capacity market39 
Our analysis suggests that this area warrants further investigation, particularly relating to the 
appropriate diversity factor that should apply to distribution peak capacity relative to 
transmission peak capacity and generation peak capacity.  
 
3. Value of avoided carbon emissions 
Given the current contentious nature of the climate policy debate in Australia, the AER may be 
understandably reluctant to explicitly include a value for avoided carbon emissions in the DM 
38 ACIL Allen Consulting, Fuel and Technology Cost Review, 2014 
https://www.aemo.com.au/media/Fuel_and_Technology_Cost_Review_Report_ACIL_Allen.pdf  
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Incentive Scheme.  However it could, as a minimum, publish an estimate of the value for avoided 
carbon emissions, so that avoided carbon emissions could be accounted for even if not included 
in the calculations for the DMIS.    
The Australian Government has effectively already attributed such a value through the auctions 
under the Emission Reduction Fund (ERF).  The market-clearing price for the most recent ERF 
auction was $10.69/t CO2equivalent.40  ISF used this figure in the DMIR Model.  
 
4. Network Option Value  
The current value of an asset or option associated with the possibility that it may be worth more 
in the future is its option value. DM solutions have option value where they involve the 
possibility of avoiding costs to a later date, due to changed circumstances. 
DM solutions are usually valued based directly on their capacity to avoid or defer specific 
imminent supply capex.  However, DM often has another significant but less obvious option 
value. By deferring specific supply infrastructure expenditure, DM solutions also create time for 
circumstances to change.  During this time period, the need for the supply capex solution (or the 
DM opex) may be reduced or deferred, or it may disappear altogether.   
For the purposes of our modelling, we have simply included an arbitrary 10% chance of 
circumstances changing (e.g. peak demand reducing) so that the anticipated network constraint 
disappears five years after it is first expected to occur.  This leads to a major option value in Case 
1, associated with avoiding the need for a major network augmentation, and a minor option 
value in Cases 2 and 3, associated with removing the need to continue the DM opex activity.  
There is no option value in Case 4, as this case involves eventually relying fully on the DM 
solution to provide electricity supply via a standalone mini-grid, as an alternative to replacing 
centralised grid supply to the fringe-of-grid community. 
 
40 Australian Government Emission Reductions Fund, 4th Auction, Nov 2016, 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-results/November-2016  
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4 COMPETITION IN DM SERVICES 
The AER has suggested that “enhancing competition” should be considered as an additional criterion 
in implementing the rules for establishing the DM Incentive Scheme41.  ISF strongly supports this 
additional criterion, provided that it serves the purpose of improving the outcomes for all customers 
and vulnerable customers in particular. 
At present, there is very little competition in the Australian network DM market as there is currently 
little demand from network businesses for these services.  Network DM depends on detailed 
information regarding network conditions and the timing, scale and nature of the network 
constraint.  Moreover, given the recent adoption of the final Electricity Ring-fencing Guidelines, the 
network businesses will normally be expected to contract with a third-party provider of DM 
services.42   
Simply regulating network businesses, or directing them to provide information to the market, or 
directing them to contract for cost-effective DM services, is very unlikely to result in the 
development of DM services.  This is particularly so in the current regulatory environment where 
there is evidence through our modelling that it is contrary to the network business’s financial interest 
to do introduce DM measures. 
In these circumstances, it is very difficult to develop an effective DM market unless the network is 
incentivised to do so.   
It is desirable to develop a vibrant, efficient and competitive market for network DM services, 
particularly in the context of the rapid development of decentralised energy technologies.  To this 
end, network businesses should be encouraged by the DM Incentive Scheme to procure network DM 
services from a range of DM service providers.  
Decentralised energy resources that provide DM services to network businesses are also likely to be 
able to provide DM services, now or in the future, to other parts of the electricity market, such as: 
• to the market operator as ancillary services, and  
• to retailers and pool price-exposed customers as a hedge against high price events.   
It is therefore important that contractual arrangements for providing DM services to network 
businesses do not preclude the business from providing these services to other parties, as some 
anecdotal evidence suggests may have occurred.  
It should also be noted that accounting for and including net market benefits in a DM Incentive 
Scheme in no way reduces the availability of these benefits to other market participants, for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the benefits considered above (value of transmission, generation and storage 
capacity, option value and value of avoided carbon emissions) are generally unavailable to other 
parties at present. Secondly, even if this were not the case, an allowance for the net market benefits 
included in a DM Incentive Scheme would be funded by all network customers, rather than by those 
seeking to access these other net market benefits. 
41 See Section 4.1, Australian Electricity Regulator,   Consultation paper: Demand management incentive scheme and 
innovation allowance mechanism, (Jan 2017)  
42 Australian Electricity Regulator,   Ring-fencing Guideline, Electricity Distribution, (Nov 2016),  
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/AER%20Ring-fencing%20Guideline%20-%2030%20November%202016.pdf  
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5 DM INNOVATION ALLOWANCE 
It was outside the scope of this DM Incentives Review to address the DM Innovation Allowance.  
However, ISF offers the following brief comments on the DM Innovation Allowance as they are also 
relevant to issue of the DM Incentive Scheme. 
ISF supports the AER in its conclusion that the existing Innovation Allowance “has not been effective 
in encouraging an efficient level of demand management activity”.  ISF strongly supports providing 
funding for innovative DM projects and research through mechanisms like a DM Innovation 
Allowance.  If DM is delivered by a performance-based DM Incentive Payment (focused on a metric 
of dollars per kilowatt (or per kilovolt amp) of peak demand reduction per year), it may be desirable 
to expand the role of the DM Innovation Allowance to support delivery of other important but less 
easily quantified non-peak demand related benefits of DM. These may include benefits related to 
voltage management, power factor management and non-peak related reliability.  Of course, if a 
cost-related DM Cost Uplift is applied instead, then this argument does not apply. 
In any case, the DM Innovation Allowance must be applied in a constructive and effective manner.  
Indeed, it is plausible that to date, the current DM Innovation Allowance has actually been 
counterproductive to the development of DM by: 
• potentially signalling to network businesses and others that the AER regards DM as small-
scale, immature and uncommercial; 
• distracting network businesses and the AER from less “innovative” but more cost-effective 
opportunities for DM; 
• confining funding of network DM research to network businesses only.  
 
As outlined by the AER, competition is a key driver of innovation.  The DM Innovation Allowance may 
be more successful if the funding is more open to competitive bids.  One option to achieve this would 
be if the DM Innovation Allowance funds from network businesses were to be pooled and made 
available on a competitive basis, including among network businesses.  
ISF recommends that the AER draw on the following lessons from its experience of the DM Incentive 
Allowance, when developing a DM Incentive Scheme: 
• DM needs to be treated as a serious resource for assisting the network business to provide 
services to their customers. 
• Available expenditure and cost recovery for network DM needs to be commensurate with 
the scale of the opportunity.  
• Transparent, consistent and effective measurement, verification and reporting of 
performance is crucial.  This monitoring needs to be focused on maximising benefits for 
consumers. Reporting structures should be in place to ensure that future projects deliver 
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6 TRANSITIONAL DM MEASURES  
6.1 The rationale for transitional measures  
The DM Incentive Scheme is intended to be introduced in the next network regulatory period in each 
NEM jurisdiction. This means the new DM Incentive Scheme will be introduced as follows:  
 
DM Incentive Scheme commencement date Jurisdiction 
July 2019 NSW, ACT, NT 
July 2020 SA, Queensland, Tasmania 
Jan 2021 Victoria 
 
This means that there is still a period of between two and four years (including up to four summer 
peak periods) before the new DM Incentive Scheme is fully implemented.  Meanwhile, recent events 
have highlighted the urgency of increasing the provision of load reduction and flexible capacity that 
DM can provide.   These recent developments include:  
• the South Australian statewide blackout in September 2016 and the smaller blackout of 
90,000 customers in February 2017 
• the subsequent South Australian electricity reform package announced by Premier 
Weatherill in March 2017  
• the “near miss” high peak demand day in March 2017 where NSW narrowly averted a 
blackout by relying on a range of resources, including emergency DM in the form of large-
scale interruptible supply contract at Tomago aluminium smelter and public appeals for 
consumers to moderate demand  
• the closure of eight coal fired power stations across the NEM, plus the closure of the 
2000MW Hazelwood power station in Victoria 
• a suite of warnings of possible generation capacity shortfalls, including by AEMO 
• the rapid growth in both small-scale and large-scale variable-output renewable energy 
capacity being developed in the NEM, particularly driven by the Renewable Energy Target.     
Given these trends, there is a strong value and reliability imperative for complementary interim DM 
mechanisms to be established to avoid lost opportunities between now and 2021.  Some jurisdictions 
have recognised the importance of accelerating the development of DM in this context. 
For example, the NSW Government has indicated its intention to “jump start the demand 
management market in NSW” in its Climate Change Fund Draft Strategic Plan, as set out below:    
Reduce peak demand through battery storage and other demand management measures 
The NSW Government will support a strong demand management market to reduce infrastructure 
costs and greenhouse gas emissions.  
Potential actions include: 
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» engage with the COAG Energy Council to reform the National Electricity Rules to reduce barriers to 
broad-based demand management 
» advocate to the Australian Energy Regulator for greater implementation of demand management by 
network businesses 
» jump start the demand management market during the current regulatory cycle with reverse 
auctions to reduce peak demand through technologies such as appliance demand response and battery 
storage 
» work with network businesses and energy efficiency service providers to coordinate information 
required to target energy savings at grid constrained areas.43 
 
Similarly, the Victorian Government has committed to “work with the Community and industry to 
develop a Victorian energy demand management framework”.   In writing to the Chair of the AER, 
the Victorian Minister for Energy and Resources, Hon. Lily D’Ambrosio MP, indicated,  
As the only jurisdiction to have undertaken a rollout of smart meters, Victoria is in a unique position to 
deploy a range of technologies and services to manage electricity demand.  This framework will 
identify measures to assist households and small businesses to manage their demand more effectively, 
particularly in peak periods.  This will be developed to complement national schemes, such as the 
Demand Management Incentive Scheme, which is scheduled to apply in Victoria from 2021.44 
In developing such interim DM incentive mechanisms, there are several key principles that should be 
observed.  These include: 
1. Maximise benefits to customers, both in terms of supporting electricity supply reliability and 
the value of savings. 
2. Support least cost outcomes, in the mix of decentralised energy resources and network 
resources deployed, in seeking efficient resource delivery, and in the scale of activity 
supported. 
3. Avoid lost opportunities that may otherwise arise due to the delay in the implementation of 
the DM Incentive Scheme, 
4. Seek to maximise the consistency and complementarity between the interim DM measures 
and the new DM Incentive Scheme, both in relation the type of DM supported and in the 
pace that it is developed.  
5. Support capacity building within the network businesses and the decentralised energy/DM 
product and service suppliers, in order to facilitate a smooth and rapid transition to the DM 
Incentive Scheme.  
As the costs of such interim DM measures are unlikely to be funded via cost recovery from the 
network business prior to the next regulatory periods, other sources of funding and cost recovery will 
be required.  The most obvious source of such funding is from state government budget funding.  
While general government budget funding is often scarce, this is the source that has been proposed 
for the NSW Climate Change Fund (via the Climate Change Levy on energy consumers), the South 
Australian Energy Plan and the “Snowy 2.0” pumped hydro storage facility, so there are strong 
precedents for such an approach. 
43 NSW Government,   Climate Change Fund Draft Strategic Plan (Nov 2016) 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/climatechange/Environmentalfuturefundingpackage/draft-climate-change-fund-strategic-
plan-160438.pdf  
44 Victorian Minister for Energy and Resources, Hon Lily D’Ambrosio, Letter to Paula Conboy , Chair of the Australian Energy 
Regulator, 21 December 2015  
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/Victorian%20Energy%20Minister%20-%20Distribution%20network%20pricing%20arrangements%20-
%2021%20December%202015.pdf  
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Given the underdeveloped state of the DM market in Australia at present, it is appropriate that 
funding should start at a modest level and be gradually increased in line with development of the 
market.  There is also merit in using a competitive procurement process in order to maximise the 
cost effectiveness in selecting projects.   Combining these two principles of moderate initial scale and 
competitive procurement, a reverse auction as proposed by the NSW Government’s Climate Change 
Fund Draft Strategic Plan may be an appropriate approach.45 
The use of reverse auctions or similar competitive processes for procuring DM is quite common.  
Indeed, the RIT-D process requires such a competitive request for proposal process, including for DM 
services, as a precondition for approval of network augmentation projects greater than  
$5 million in value.  The NSW Energy Savings Fund held two large successful reverse auctions for DM 
projects in 2005 and 2006. (See “useful precedents” below.)   
ARENA and AEMO are also currently collaborating in a similar competitive process to procure 
Demand Response through the AEMO’s Reliability and Emergency Reserve Trader (RERT) facility.  
To conduct a successful reverse auction a number of key elements are required.  Several of these 
elements are discussed below. 
6.2 Clearly defined deliverables 
It is recommended that DM services requested by the reverse auction be defined primarily in terms 
of the volume of kilowatts (or kilovolt amps) of peak demand reduction per year.  Accordingly, the 
cost-effectiveness measure should be defined primarily in terms of dollars of funding requested per 
of kilowatt (or kilovolt amp) of peak demand reduction per year.  This would still be workable even if 
the AER adopted a cost-based DM Cost Uplift. 
As discussed in Section 3.3, while this kilowatt of peak demand reduction per year metric does not 
capture all possible value of DM services, such as voltage and power factor management and non-
peak demand related reliability, it is the most uniform and practical metric for comparative purposes. 
Other relevant metrics include the value of network savings, the value of customer bill reductions 
and the quantity of energy saved (MWh) or carbon emissions avoided. However, value estimates 
involve a range of variables that are harder to measure and compare.   
The quantity of energy measure saved would likely overlap with existing energy efficiency incentives 
schemes like the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target and the NSW and ACT Energy Savings Scheme. 
The carbon emissions measure may overlap with the Commonwealth Emissions Reduction Fund. 
6.3 Targetting and exclusions 
Given the limited scale of the transitional DM incentives, governments may choose to target those 
areas of DM that are considered to have the greatest need, value or potential. For example, there 
may be merit in targeting residential air conditioning load control, and pre-cooling, as an area of 
focus, given residential air conditioning is the biggest driver of peak demand and is a major 
prospective area of new energy management technology development for DM.  Alternatively, the 
transitional DM incentives may seek to achieve a balance of residential, commercial and industrial 
45 Unlike a normal auction that involves multiple buyers competing to bid the highest market clearing price level, a reverse 
auction involves multiple providers competing to bid to the lowest market clearing price level to provide a defined service, 
in this case a given level of DM.  
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DM. The transitional DM incentives could also be targeted to achieve other objectives, such as 
innovation, equity, reliability and security.  
Conversely, the transitional DM incentives may deliberately seek to exclude certain types of DM on 
the grounds that they are either already relatively well developed or risk double counting, or “free 
riders”.  For example, transitional DM incentives could exclude DM that is already in place or under 
contract, or whole categories for which it is hard to identify and exclude such free riders, such as 
large-scale industrial interruptible load.  The transitional DM incentives may also wish to avoid 
technologies that are already well supported through other government programs, such as battery 
storage, or technologies that may be considered as having adverse environmental impacts such as 
diesel generation in densely populated areas. 
The above targeting or exclusions are illustrative and are not necessarily recommended, but are 
presented here as possible considerations in developing transitional DM incentives. 
6.4 Available or dispatched capacity?  
Many DM resources, particularly interruptible load or “demand response”, are only called on to be 
used or “dispatched” in circumstances of supply constraint. This is an efficient use of the resources as 
there is usually a significant cost and/or inconvenience for electricity customers in dispatching these 
resources.  So in general, it is appropriate that such resources should be paid separately for their 
availability and for their dispatch.  However, for the purposes of a government funded program to 
develop the DM market and build confidence, there is likely to be merit in requiring that all resources 
supported by the incentives should be dispatched in earnest at least once per year. 
6.5 Clearly defined scale and budget 
Transitional DM incentives will be subject to budget constraints, particularly if resourced by general 
government funding. Such budget constraints will need to be carefully managed. The budget will also 
need to be matched to the scale of the policy objective.   If the primary intent is to develop the 
DER/DM market to a level at which it can smoothly transition to a full DM Incentive Scheme, then the 
scale of the transitional DM incentives will need to ramped up to achieve this.   
To illustrate the scale of funding that may be appropriate, let us assume that DM Incentive Scheme 
aims to achieve, by about the end of the next regulatory periods, a level comparable to the current 
average level of DM in the USA – roughly 9% of peak demand. This would entail an NEM-wide target 
of about 3000 MWpeak of DM capacity by about 2025.46   Let us further assume that the transitional 
DM incentives aim to achieve just 10 per cent of this level by 2020.  This would imply a target of 300 
MWpeak of DM capacity by 2020.  Assuming a DM incentive cost of $75/kWp per year (in the middle of 
our recommended range of $50–100 /kWp per year – see Section 3), and a conservative average life 
of DM measures of three years, this would amount to an annual incentive cost of about $22.5 million 
per annum between 2018 and 2020.  Administration and direct market development costs would be 
in addition to this.  
46 This is a relatively modest target compared to the roughly 6000MW of new renewable energy capacity to be built in 
Australia by 2020 in order to  meet the  Renewable Energy Target, according to the Clean Energy Council, 
https://www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/policy-advocacy/renewable-energy-target.html .  It should also be borne in mind 
that the higher is the level of variable output renewable energy capacity, then the higher is the potential need for flexible 
DM to complement this capacity. 
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6.6 Relevant precedents 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to review DM programs in detail, the following programs 
provide useful precedents and illustrate the capacity for Australian governments and utilities to   run 
successful cost-effective DM programs.   
 
Victorian Demand Management Action Plan 
The ground-breaking Victorian Demand Management Action Plan was established in 1990 by the 
State Electricity Commission of Victoria to investigate strategies to moderate the demand for 
electricity. At the time, this was by far the largest and most comprehensive DM program undertaken 
in Australia to date.  The Demand Management Action Plan identified and demonstrated many cost-
effective measures for consumers to save energy.   Between 1990 and 1993, $27.5 million was 
expended, delivering an estimated net economic benefit of $44.5 million.47 
 
Queensland Energy Conservation and Demand Management Program  
In 2009, the Queensland Government committed $44.7 million in budget funds to the Queensland 
Energy Conservation and Demand Management Program. This program was implemented in 
collaboration with the two Queensland distribution network businesses, Energex and Ergon Energy 
and aimed to reduce peak demand by 40 MW, and deliver an expected saving of $120 million in 
transmission, distribution and generation infrastructure.48  This program and its legacy are largely 
responsible for Queensland distribution network businesses currently being widely regarded as the 
leaders in network DM in Australia. 
 
NSW Energy Savings Fund 
The NSW Energy Savings Fund was established in 2005 to provide $40 million per annum over five 
years49 in incentives to “encourage innovative and practical investment in measures such as energy 
efficiency, peak load management and localised generation”.50  In its first two years of operation, $29 
million was allocated, delivering estimated savings of 189,000 MWh per annum at a cost of $15 per 
MWh, and 46,560 kW per annum of demand reduction at an estimated cost of $61/kW per 
annum.51,52   This is a relatively low cost for demand reduction, particularly given that peak demand 
reduction was not the primary focus for the Energy Savings Fund.  
47 Electricity Services Victoria, Demand Management Action Plan, Final Report, Book 1, September 1994 
48 Queensland Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation,  Queensland Energy  Management 
Plan, May  2011, www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/grants/08626_ccfannualreport.pdf   
49 Sydney Morning Herald,  NSW Government  to Promote Energy, Water Saving, 5 April 2005  
http://www.smh.com.au/news/Business/NSW-govt-to-promote-energy-water-savings/2005/04/05/1112489481575.html 
50 NSW Government, Energy Savings Fund, guide for applicants, Round one , September 2015 
51 Assuming the same 10 year average life for demand reductions implied by the cost of energy savings. 
52 NSW Department of Environment and Climate Change, NSW Climate Change Fund, Annual Report 2007-2008, Dec 2008  
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/grants/08626_ccfannualreport.pdf 
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APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX A:  DMIR STUDY SCOPE 
Introduction 
In future, network businesses will need to ensure an efficient balance between centralised and 
decentralised energy resources, and between network and non-network options, including demand 
management (DM).  In principle, network businesses are already required to ensure a balanced 
approach to network investment and DM through their “demand side engagement strategies” and in 
particular, through their Regulatory Investment Test (RIT) process.  However, the extent to which 
network businesses undertake DM and directly support DER is variable and depends in part on ring-
fencing provisions.  In any case, network businesses are a pivotal party in expanding the focus of 
electricity sector investment to include DER alternatives via DM.   
It is therefore essential that network businesses are offered fair and balanced incentives when 
making their procurement decisions.  If regulatory incentives are efficient, the business should 
achieve higher net profit, if they undertake measures that deliver higher net benefits to their 
customers.  However, if regulatory incentives are inefficient and biased, a network business may 
achieve a lower net profit from a DM (opex) solution that delivers a higher net benefit for customers 
(or vice versa). 
Thus, the DM Incentives Review was designed to test the following hypothesis. 
STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
In a situation where a network business faces a network constraint with two equally reliable 
solutions – a network (capex) and a DM (opex) solution – the current regulatory incentives will 
allow the network business to achieve a higher net profit from the capex solution, even in the case 
that the opex solution delivers lower cost and/or higher net benefit for customers. 
 
The DM Incentives Review investigated the following research questions in order to test the 
hypothesis: 
• Are current network regulatory incentives for DM fit for purpose to deliver least cost, reliable 
outcomes for electricity consumers? 
• If not, how should these regulatory incentives change? 
• How should network businesses compare DER with network options to maximise overall 
value for electricity consumers? 
 
The DM Incentives Review concept was developed through ARENA’s A-Lab ‘incubation’ process.  The 
co-design team included: ARENA, A-Lab facilitators; the University of Technology Sydney’s Institute 
for Sustainable Futures (ISF); Energy Networks Australia (ENA); two network core partners; three DER 
providers; and other consultants.  The outcome of the process is the structure outlined in Figure 14 
below. 
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Figure 14. DM Incentives Review concept 
 
The study addressed the practical financial challenges in the regulatory landscape faced by network 
businesses when considering greater uptake of DER and more active DM through three processes: 
1. undertaking a stocktake of network regulatory incentives for DM 
2. designing efficient DM incentives for DER 
3. evaluating DER for networks. 
The model 
The cornerstone of the DM Incentives Review was the development of a model to analyse how 
network businesses currently assess network investment and DM options to address network 
constraints – that is, how these options are expected to impact their costs and revenues. The findings 
of the analysis were intended to directly identify the barriers to network businesses transitioning 
towards a more decentralised and service-oriented business model. 
The modelling followed the path outlined in Figure 15 below. 
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Figure 15. DM Incentives Review modelling method 
 
The model: 
• accounts for capex, opex, debt, equity, depreciation and tax 
• includes the EBSS, CESS, STPIS and a proposed DM Incentive Scheme53 
• accounts for reliability via impacts on Expected Unserved Energy (EUSE) 
• considers load growth over time 
• includes estimated values for net market benefits, but does not include these in the cost-
benefit analysis, except where explicitly stated for complementary analysis.  
 
53 EBSS = Efficiency Benefit Sharing Scheme; CESS = Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme; STPIS = Service Target 
Performance Incentive Scheme; DMIS = Demand Management Incentive Scheme 
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APPENDIX B:  DM Incentives Review Model - Dashboard 
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Sensitivity and break-even analysis for DMIP 
Case 1: 30 year modelling results Network solution DM solution Impact of DM 

























No DMIP  (without full 
DM Cost recovery) No 0  44.56 4.86% 92.8 25.84 4.7% 
128.3 
(+35.9 NMB) 
Customers large gain,                    
DNB loses 
Equalise DNB net profit No 83  44.56 4.86% 92.8 44.56 5.1% 107.9 Customers gain,                   DNB neutral (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity No 44 44.56 4.86% 92.8 35.71 4.86% 117.5   
Customers gain,                   
DNB  neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) No 145  44.56 4.86% 92.8 58.50 5.4% 92.8 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB),  
DNB gain 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) No 292 44.56 4.86% 92.8 91.47 6.1% 
57.0             
(+35.9 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB),  
DNB large gain 
No DMIP  (with full DM 
Cost recovery) Yes 0  44.56 4.86% 92.8 31.52 4.8% 
122.3  
(+35.9 NMB) 
Customers gain,                    
DNB loses 
Equalise DNB net profit Yes 58  44.56 4.86% 92.8 44.56 5.1% 108.2 
Customers gain,                   
DNB neutral (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity Yes 14 44.56 4.86% 92.8 34.67 4.86% 118.9 
Customers gain,                   
DNB neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) Yes 121  44.56 4.86% 92.8 58.71 5.4% 92.8 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB), 
DNB gain 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) Yes 267  44.56 4.86% 92.8 91.67 6.2% 
57.0    
(+35.9 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB large gain) 
DMIP = Demand Management Incentive Payment  DNB = Network Service Provider NMB = Net market benefits RoE = Return on Equity 
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Case 2: 30 year modelling results Network solution DM solution Impact of DM 

























No DMIP  (without full 
DM Cost recovery) No 0  0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.27 2.3% 
0.1        
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB net profit No 83  0.09 4.88% 0.2 0.09 7.7% -0.4        (+0.4 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB “neutral” (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity No 47.8 0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.06 4.88% 
-0.2       
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) No n.a. (-24)  0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.38 -2.3% 0.2 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB),  
DNB loses 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) No 57  0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.02 5.8% 
-0.2       
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB loses (excl. RoE) 
No DMIP  (with full DM 
Cost recovery) Yes 0 0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.10 2.8% 
-0.1       
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB net profit Yes 47 0.09 4.88% 0.2 0.09 9.3% -0.4       (+0.4 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB “neutral” (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity Yes 14.93  0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.03 4.88% 
-0.2       
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB neutral (incl. RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) Yes n.a. (-62) 0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.37 3.5% 0.2 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) Yes 20 0.09 4.88% 0.2 -0.01 6.1% 
-0.2       
(+0.4 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB loses (excl. RoE) 
DMIP = Demand Management Incentive Payment  DNB = Network Service Provider NMB = Net market benefits RoE = Return on Equity 
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Case 3: 30 year modelling results Network solution DM solution Impact of DM 
























No DMIP  (without full 
DM Cost recovery) No 0  4.67 4.89% 7.9 -3.95 3.5% 
18.23      
(+7.1 NMB) 
Customers large gain,                    
DNB loses 
Equalise DNB net profit No 119  4.67 4.89% 7.9 4.67 10.4% 8.2 Customers gain,                   DNB neutral (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity No   48.4 4.67 4.89% 7.9 -0.45 4.89% 14.2 
Customers gain,                   
DNB neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) No 122  4.67 4.89% 7.9 4.89 10.4% 7.9 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB),  
DNB gain 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) No 206 4.67 4.89% 7.9 10.95 10.8% 
0.9      
(+7.1 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB),  
DNB large gain 
No DMIP  (with full DM 
Cost recovery) Yes 0  4.67 4.89% 7.9 -0.51 5.0% 14.3 
Customers gain,                    
DNB loses 
Equalise DNB net profit Yes 72  4.67 4.89% 7.9 4.67 10.8% 8.3 
Customers gain,                   
DNB neutral (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity Yes n.a (-1) 4.67 4.89% 7.9 -0.57 4.89% 14.4 
Customers gain,                   
DNB neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) Yes 76  4.67 4.89% 7.9 4.96 10.8% 7.9 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB), 
DNB gain 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) Yes 160 4.67 4.89% 7.9 11.02 10.9% 
0.8      
(+7.1 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB large gain) 
DMIP = Demand Management Incentive Payment  DNB = Network Service Provider NMB = Net market benefits RoE = Return on Equity 
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Case 4: 30 year modelling results 
Network solution DM solution Impact of DM 
























No DMIP  (without full 
DM Cost recovery) No 0  0.90 4.87% 2.7 -2.28 2.0% 
1.5      
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses  
Equalise DNB net profit No 62  0.90 4.87% 2.7 0.90 8.0% -2.1    (+4.6 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB “neutral” (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity No 34.3  0.90 4.87% 2.7 -0.52 4.87% 
-0.5    
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB neutral (RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) No n.a (-19) 0.90 4.87% 2.7 -3.26 2.5% 2.7 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB),  
DNB loses 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) No 60 0.90 4.87% 2.7 0.79 7.8% 
-1.9     
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB loses 
No DMIP  (with full DM 
Cost recovery) Yes 0  0.90 4.87% 2.7 -1.02 2.5% 
0.2      
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB net profit Yes 37  0.90 4.87% 2.7 0.90 8.9% -2.0 
Customers lose (excl. NMB), 
DNB “neutral” (excl. RoE) 
Equalise DNB return on 
equity Yes 12.45 0.90 4.87% 2.7 -0.38 4.87% 
-0.5    
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB neutral (incl. RoE) 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (excl. NMB) Yes n.a (-42)  0.90 4.87% 2.7 -3.17 3.2% 2.7 
Customers neutral (excl. NMB), 
DNB loses 
Equalise cust. net 
benefit (incl. NMB) Yes 37  0.90 4.87% 2.7 0.88 8.9% 
-1.9    
(+4.6 NMB) 
Customers neutral (incl. NMB), 
DNB loses 
DMIP = Demand Management Incentive Payment  DNB = Network Service Provider NMB = Net market benefits RoE = Return on Equity 
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Appendix D:  US Electricity Efficiency Spending   
54 
 
54 Weston Berg, Seth Nowak, Meegan Kelly, Shruti Vaidyanathan,  Mary Shoemaker, Anna Chittum, Marianne DiMascio, 
and Chetana Kallakuri The 2016 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, September 2016 
http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1606.pdf  
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In 2015, total spending for electricity efficiency programs reached approximately $6.3 billion. 
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APPENDIX E:  DMIR Study Reference Group 
Representatives of the following organisations participated in the Study Reference Group (SRG) for 






Energy Networks Australia 
EnerNOC 
EnergyQ (Ergon and Energex) 
GreenSync 
SA Power Networks 
Schneider Electric 
UTS Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF)  
Victorian Department of Energy, Land, Water & Planning (DELWP) 
Oakley Greenwood (Observer) 
The SRG provided very valuable input and feedback to the project team.  ISF is very grateful to all 
those who contributed to the Study Reference Group. However, ISF is solely responsible for the 
content of this report and it does not necessarily represent the views of any other organisation 
listed above.  
The SRG held three teleconferences between December 2016 and March 2017 and participated in 
email based dialogue and the broader stakeholders’ consultation, including a half-day face-to-face 
workshop.   
 
 
ISF DMIR Project Team: 
Chris Dunstan, Dani Alexander, Tom Morris, Ed Langham, Melita Jazbec.   
The project team also wishes to thank UTS colleagues who assisted in the project: Paul Brown, 
Bridget McIntosh, Stuart White, Xavier Mayes, Tui Prichard, Lawrie McIntosh and Jenni Downes. 
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